This paper empirically investigates two issues largely unexplored by the literature on market discipline. First, we evaluate the interaction between market discipline and deposit insurance. Secondly, we analyze the impact of banking crises on market discipline. We focus on the experiences of Argentina, Chile, and Mexico during the 1980s and 1990s. Using bank level data for these countries, we find that depositors discipline banks by withdrawing deposits and by requiring higher interest rates. Across countries and across deposit insurance schemes, market discipline exists even among small, insured depositors. Finally, banking crises seem to increase investors' responsiveness to bank risk taking. Over the last two decades, both developed and developing countries have endured severe banking crises. The U.S. savings and loans (S&Ls) debacle, the Chilean banking crisis in the 1980s, the Argentine and Mexican crises in the mid-1980s and 1990s, as well as the financial stress in Asia and Russia are only a few examples. At all times and, particularly, in order to avoid banking crises, regulators need to find ways to promote prudent behavior by banks. The standard recommendation is for countries to tighten supervision and prudential regulations. Alternatively, rather than depending exclusively on regulatory action, banking authorities can also increase their reliance on market discipline to oversee banks.
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when they see another bank fail. Consequently, deposit insurance lowers the probability of systemic bank runs. At the same time, a credible deposit insurance system reduces the incentives of depositors to monitor banks, diminishing the degree of market discipline.
Banking crises are particularly interesting times to study market discipline. First, banking crises may increase the awareness of depositors concerning the riskiness of their deposits. Therefore, after banking crises, we might see an increase in market discipline. Second, there are large deposit shifts during crises, relative to how deposits behave during stable times. Finally, banking crises could be largely the result of a macroeconomic or aggregate shock. Then, during crises, we might observe an increase in the relative importance of macroeconomic and systemic factors, common across banks.
The existing literature on market discipline primarily focuses on whether market discipline exists in a particular country during a given period. Most of the papers focus on the U.S. commercial banking industry.
1 Baer and Brewer (1986) , Hannan and Hanweck (1988) , Ellis and Flannery (1992) , and Cook and Spellman (1994) , among others, analyze how yields on deposits respond to bank risk taking, as captured by balance sheets and by market measures of risk. Goldberg and Hudgins (1996) and Calormiris and Wilson (1998) examine this question by concentrating on the level or change of deposits. Park (1995) and Park and Peristiani (1998) combine both approaches mentioned above. 2 Calomiris and Mason (1997) study whether bank failures are related to bank risk characteristics. Overall, these papers support the hypothesis that market discipline is at work in the U.S.
Whereas the literature on market discipline is quite vast for the U.S., there are only a few papers on this subject for the case of developing countries. The main contributors to this market discipline literature are Valdes and Lomakin (1988) , Schumacher (1996) , and D'Amato, Grubisic, and Powell (1997) . Valdes and Lomakin (1988) examine interest rate changes associated with bank riskiness in Chile in the mid-1980s. Schumacher (1996) analyzes how deposits across Argentine banks are affected by their probability of failure.
D'Amato et al. study contagion effects in depositors' behavior in Argentina, after controlling for macroeconomic factors and for the level of bank fundamentals at the beginning of their sample.
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This paper empirically examines two issues largely unexplored by the literature on market discipline. First, the paper studies the interaction between deposit insurance and market discipline. 3 Secondly, the paper investigates the impact of banking crises on market discipline. We focus on the experiences of the Argentinean, Chilean, and Mexican banking sectors over the last two decades. The analysis in this paper is interesting not only because we concentrate on three of the most important Latin
American banking systems, but also because the developments in these countries and the unique bank level data we put together enable us to conduct a very thorough study of market discipline, deposit insurance, and banking crises.
First, we are able to evaluate the full extent of market discipline in each country, by examining both the behavior of deposits and interest rates. In other words, we can study whether depositors punish banks for bad behavior by withdrawing deposits and/or by requiring higher interest rates on their deposits.
Furthermore, by evaluating the response of both deposit flows and interest rates to bank risk characteristics, we can distinguish between market and regulatory discipline. Regulatory discipline refers to a situation in which bank deposits drop because regulators force banks to reduce their risky assets and increase their level of capitalization.
Second, given that in most cases we have data by amount of deposits, we can discriminate between the behavior of insured and uninsured deposits and between large and medium deposits. The data on insured and uninsured depositors allows us to examine the relationship between market discipline and deposit insurance. In particular, we can test whether both insured and uninsured depositors discipline banks. Furthermore, because in some instances the deposit insurance scheme was introduced or modified during our sample of study, we can examine the extent of market discipline before and after the introduction or the change in deposit insurance coverage. Also, by comparing the response of insured and uninsured depositors to changes in bank risk taking, we can draw conclusions on the credibility of the existing deposit insurance schemes. Our evaluation in this regard is particularly interesting because we are dealing with three countries, each with different deposit insurance schemes. 4 Finally, since we focus on countries that have experienced banking crises in the course of the sample, we are able to assess whether these episodes act as "wake-up calls" for depositors.
In other words, we analyze whether the responsiveness of depositors to bank risk taking changes during or after banking crises.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the data and the empirical methodology we use. Section III presents the empirical results. Section IV concludes.
II -Data and Empirical Methodology

II.a -Data
One important contribution of this paper is the novel data set we put together and analyze. In particular, we collected bank level data for Argentina, Chile, and Mexico to examine market discipline in these countries. Even though some bank level data have become more easily available in the last years and some financial services have started to report cross-country data, detailed, comprehensive, and reliable panel data sets are still not available. For this reason, we collected bank specific data, with the help of the Central Bank of Argentina, the Superintendency of Banking (Argentina), the Central Bank of Chile, the Superintendency of Banking and Financial Institutions (Chile), and the National Banking and Securities Commission (Mexico). 4 These agencies oversee banks in each country. All banks are required to disclose their financial statements to the banking authorities on a regular basis. All the bank specific balance sheet information is collected periodically, but published and available to the public with a lag of around two months. Most bank specific data are available at a quarterly frequency, although some variables exist on a monthly basis.
In close consultation with the financial supervisors and regulators, we gathered historical data.
We constructed consistent variables over time and we built panels for each country. We also controlled for those cases when banks merged or were acquired. This is particularly relevant because during the period analyzed the banking industries of these countries underwent substantial restructuring. With respect to the interest rates paid on deposits, for Argentina, Chile, and Mexico, we use an implicit interest rate measure. This implicit rate is calculated by dividing the total interest rate expenses by the total interest bearing deposits.
The bank level measures of risk are akin to those used in the CAMEL rating system of banks.
CAMEL stands for capital adequacy, asset quality, management, earnings, and liquidity. In general, we expect a deterioration in the CAMEL indicators, which would signal an increase in the risk profile of banks, to cause interest rates to rise and deposits to fall.
Capital adequacy is measured by the capital to assets ratio. We expect the capital adequacy variable to have a positive effect on bank deposits. On the other hand, higher capitalization ratios are expected to allow banks to pay lower interest rates on their deposits.
A number of indicators are used as measures of asset quality. A clear signal of asset quality is the ratio of non-performing to total loans. This ratio measures the percentage of loans a bank might have to 6 write off as losses. We expect this variable to have a negative impact on deposits and a positive effect on interest rates.
The concentration of loan portfolios also captures the quality of the assets held by banks. In general, a large exposure to a vulnerable sector, like real estate, raises banks' risks. On the other hand, because most real estate loans are mortgage loans-i.e., loans where the assets in question serve as collateral-it is possible that these loans can be considered relatively safe. Thus, it is a-priori unclear what impact we expect the ratio of real estate loans to total loans to have on deposit or interest rate behavior.
We face a similar uncertainty when analyzing personal or consumption loans. These loans are typically granted without collateral. However, they may be easier to recall than other loans (like mortgage loans),
given that consumption loans are usually smaller and have a shorter maturity. Consequently, one might expect a rise in this type of lending to indicate either an increase or a decrease in the risk exposure of banks. Ex-ante, then, consumption loans might have either a positive or a negative impact on deposits and interest rates.
We measure banks' profitability by the return on assets ratio. In general, assuming we are adequately controlling for risk, we expect this variable to have a positive effect on deposits. On the other hand, we expect higher profitability to enable banks to offer lower interest rates.
The efficiency of banks is measured by the ratio of non-interest expenditures to total assets. Less efficient banks are expected to have higher expenditures. However, it is also the case that banks that offer a better service to customers might have higher expenditures to total assets. If we could control for the quality of service, we would expect an increase in non-interest expenditures to have a negative effect on deposits and a positive impact on interest rates. In our case, given that we cannot control for the quality of bank services, the effect of this variable is undetermined.
The cash to assets ratio is included as an indicator of banks' liquidity. In general, banks with a large volume of liquid assets are perceived to be safer, since these assets would allow a bank to meet unexpected withdrawals. In this sense, controlling for other factors, we expect more liquid banks to suffer 7 fewer deposit withdrawals and to be able to pay lower interest rates. To the extent that one can consider the bonds to assets ratio as a measure of liquidity, we would expect this variable to have a positive effect on bank deposits and a negative impact on interest rates.
Finally, in order to control for the size of banks, the logarithm of bank assets is included in the models for bank deposits. We include the logarithm of bank assets as a control variable, but it is not considered as a measure of bank risk.
II.b -Empirical Methodology
This section is devoted to a discussion of the empirical methodology used in this paper to study market discipline. We estimate two sets of models for the behavior of deposits and one set for the behavior of interest rates.
In the first place, to measure the reaction of depositors to bank risk taking we estimate the following reduced form equation: BANK i,t-1 is a vector of bank fundamentals. This vector is included with a lag, to account for the fact that balance sheet information is available to the public with a certain delay. d t is the time specific effect. We include the time specific effects to control for macroeconomic and banking sector developments, common across banks. µ i stands for each bank's specific or fixed effect. Both time and fixed effects are estimated by including the corresponding dummy variables.
Whenever possible, we report between and within estimators of equation (1). Between estimators are obtained by regressing the mean of deposits of each bank on mean values of the explanatory variables. The results allow us to compare deposit behavior across banks. For instance, the between estimators enable us to study whether banks with stronger fundamentals attract more deposits. We conduct between estimations only for Argentina, where the number of banks is sufficiently large to perform cross-section analysis. No time effects are included in the between estimates.
While between estimators exploit differences across banks, within estimators highlight the variation of deposits over time. Within estimators study deviations from each bank's mean. For instance, within estimators indicate how deviations from average bank fundamentals affect deviations of deposits from their mean. Within estimates are obtained by including a dummy variable for each bank, which controls for each bank's mean deposits.
In the specification described above for the level of deposits, simultaneity may be a problem that can give rise to biased results. Equation (1) models the log of bank deposits as a function of a number of ratios capturing bank risk plus the log level of assets. We know from the balance sheet identify that, at every point in time, assets must be equal to the sum of deposits plus bank capital. The fact that the log of assets is lagged one quarter with respect to deposits reduces the probability of having biased coefficients.
Notwithstanding, the chance that the coefficients are biased still exists, especially if the level of assets is serially correlated. However, the size and direction of the bias on the risk characteristics' coefficients is not obvious.
In order to address the simultaneity problem, we estimate the following equation:
Equation (2) regresses the first difference of the log of time deposits on the ratios capturing bank risk. Since the growth rate of deposits is not necessarily related to the asset size of banks, this specification avoids the potential simultaneity problem of the regression in levels. However, one disadvantage of this model is that the economic interpretation is less straightforward than the model estimated with equation (1), since here we are regressing changes on levels. As an alternative way of 9 addressing the potential endogeneity, we also obtain instrumented generalized method of moments (GMM) estimates. The results, which are reported in the working paper version of this paper, are similar to the ones from the regressions in levels.
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Whenever possible, we estimate various versions of equations (1) and (2) for each country. First, we distinguish between insured and uninsured deposits. This distinction is important in a study of market discipline, since a-priori we expect to find differences in the degree of market discipline across these two types of depositors. Assuming the deposit insurance scheme is credible, we expect insured depositors to have fewer incentives to monitor bank risk taking. However, if the deposit guarantee is not credible or if there are costs associated with the recovery of deposits following a bank failure, we may find evidence that insured depositors enforce market discipline. Among uninsured deposits, we distinguish between medium and large time deposits, to study whether there are differences across these groups. Since uninsured depositors' claims are not protected by the deposit guarantee, we expect these depositors to exercise market discipline.
Secondly, in our estimations of equations (1) and (2), we divide the sample period to test for the presence of market discipline before, during, and after banking crises. In the case of Argentina and Chile, we compute separate regressions for local currency (peso) and U.S. dollar deposits. For the regressions in local currency, deposits and assets are expressed in real terms (adjusted by the consumer price index) in order to control for the potential growth in nominal figures that can be due to inflation.
The finding that deposits respond to bank risk is not enough to conclude that market discipline is at work. In general, depositors can discipline banks by withdrawing deposits or by requiring higher interest rates for their deposits. If interest rates do not respond to bank risk taking, we could argue in favor of competing hypotheses. One alternative explanation for the fall in deposits is the existence of regulatory discipline. Bank regulators might force banks to reduce their risky assets, for example, by imposing capital standards. To increase the capital to assets ratio, banks need to reduce assets and-given the balance sheet identity-liabilities. Since deposits may fall as a response to either regulatory or market 10 discipline, it is very hard to distinguish the existence of one type of discipline by focusing only on deposit flows.
One way to disentangle whether deposits are responding to bank risk because of regulatory or market discipline is to evaluate the behavior of interest rates paid on deposits. If market discipline is at work, we should observe that risky banks are forced to pay high interest rates. On the other hand, if regulatory discipline is responsible for the drop in deposits, we should observe interest rates dropping or not changing in response to bank risk taking.
To analyze whether depositors discipline bank risk taking by requiring higher interest rates, we estimate the following equation:
I it is the implicit interest rate paid by bank i on its deposits at time t.
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For the estimations of equation (1), (2), and (3), we conduct and report a number of common tests. First, we perform and present F-tests to evaluate the joint significance of bank fundamentals, excluding the logarithm of bank assets (a control variable, not a measure of risk). Second, we test for the joint significance of time effects to determine whether macroeconomic and other common shocks are important in explaining the behavior of deposits and interest rates. Finally, we test for the joint significance of individual fixed effects.
For Argentina and Chile, where the deposit insurance schemes do not cover 100% of deposits and where we can easily separate insured from uninsured deposits, we explicitly evaluate the credibility of the deposit insurance schemes. We estimate similar models than before, but we use a different dependent variable, UDEP it . This variable is the ratio of uninsured time deposits to total time deposits for bank i at time t. The model is:
11 If the deposit insurance system is credible, we expect to find that uninsured depositors are more responsive to bank risk taking relative to the insured ones. Consequently, we should find that the β coefficients are different from zero. On the other hand, if none of the coefficients on the bank ratios is different from zero, we can infer that the response to bank risk taking is the same for insured and uninsured depositors. Furthermore, if both insured and uninsured deposits respond to bank risk, we can conclude that the deposit insurance system is not fully credible.
The final empirical exercise in our paper is to evaluate the relative importance of bank fundamentals. In particular, our goal is to study whether the relevance of bank fundamentals changes when banking crises occur. To measure the relative importance of bank fundamentals, we calculate the proportion of the variance explained by these variables before, during, and after crises. 7 First, we estimate equations (1), (2), and (3) with the time specific dummies and the variable bank assets, while controlling for bank specific effects. Then, we re-estimate these equations, including the bank fundamentals. We assign any correlation among the independent variables to the variables not included among the risk characteristics. Namely, to be on the safe side, we are biasing the results against the bank risk characteristics. For each estimated equation, we report the proportion of the adjusted R-squared captured by bank risk characteristics, relative to the total variance explained by all time-varying variables. We also report the adjusted R-squared (in brackets) explained by all time-varying variables. The proportion of the total variance explained by bank fundamentals is the product of these two figures.
This last exercise helps us not only to examine the impact of banking crises on market discipline, but also to evaluate the credibility of deposit insurance schemes. Since changes in the deposit insurance system took place during banking crises, by dividing our sample in the period before, during, and after crises, we can examine how these changes in the deposit insurance schemes were received. For example, if the relative importance of bank risk characteristic diminishes after the deposit insurance coverage increases, we can infer that the deposit insurance is credible. Consequently, the variance decomposition exercise also constitutes a second measure of the credibility of the deposit insurance schemes.
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III -Empirical Results
The empirical estimations we conduct in this paper can be grouped under four headings. First, we examine whether deposits are affected by changes in bank risk characteristics. Second, we analyze whether depositors exercise market discipline by requiring higher interest rates from riskier banks. Third, we evaluate the credibility of deposit insurance schemes. Finally, we study whether banking crises are "wake-up calls" for depositors. The remainder of this section reports the empirical results in the order mentioned above.
III.a -Examining the Responsiveness of Deposits to Bank Risk Taking
In this section, we evaluate whether depositors respond to bank risk taking by withdrawing their deposits. As discussed earlier, for all countries, we estimate two types of specifications to evaluate this question. In the first place, we regress the logarithm of the level of individual bank deposits on a number of ratios intended to capture bank risk. To account for potential simultaneity biases, we also regress the first difference of the log of deposits on the ratios capturing bank risk. These specifications correspond to equations (1) and (2) above, respectively. Although fixed effects and time effects are included in these regressions, we do not report them in the tables to save space. Tests for their joint significance are displayed.
The results from the estimation of equations (1) and (2) includes the so-called "tequila crisis." Until then, all deposits were uninsured. Therefore, during this 13 period, looking at banks' total time deposits is equivalent to studying the behavior of uninsured deposits.
For each of the sub-categories discussed above, we perform the estimations for dollar and peso deposits.
For the period after April 1995, we analyze the behavior of time deposits by size. 8 In particular, we conduct separate estimations for insured and uninsured deposits. According to the deposit insurance law introduced in April 1995, deposits are protected up to 20,000 pesos or dollars, depending on their maturity. 9 Deposits with a maturity of more than 90 days are protected up to 20,000 dollars or pesos. For deposits with a shorter maturity, the guarantee covers deposits of up to 10,000 pesos or dollars. Since we do not have data on the maturity of deposits, there is no clear way to separate insured from uninsured deposits with full certainty. In order to reduce the probability of including uninsured deposits in the insured group, we work with the relatively conservative cut off point of 10,000 pesos or dollars. Finally, to analyze the degree of market discipline exercised by medium size and large depositors, we distinguish between deposits in the 20,000-100,000 peso/dollar range and those larger than 100,000 pesos/dollars.
The results for the between and within estimations (reported in Tables I-II and Tables III-IV, respectively) support the finding that deposits respond to bank risk characteristics. In particular, the ratio of non-performing loans has a significant negative effect across all categories of deposits both in changes and levels. The variable is particularly significant in the pre-crisis period for the between estimates and in the post-crisis period for the within estimates. Also, for between and within the regressions in levels and changes, we find that an increase in the capital-assets ratio leads to an increase in deposits.
The within regressions in levels and changes, indicate that an increase in the expenditures to asset ratio leads to a fall in uninsured and medium size deposits. However, the between estimates show the opposite results. These between and within estimates might be reflecting that, across banks, those with higher expenditure ratios attract more customers, while for a given allocation of deposits, further expenditures decrease deposits. For the between and within regressions in levels in the post-crisis period, we find that insured, uninsured, and medium size deposits increase as banks' cash to assets ratio rise. In general, the ratio of real estate loans to total loans has a negative effect, while more profitable banks 14 attract more deposits. Finally, the within results show that bank risk characteristics are jointly significant, even after controlling for fixed effects, time effects, and size of banks. Risk characteristics are significant throughout the sample, but they are particularly significant in the post-crisis period.
Tables V and VI present the results for Chile. were intervened and most deposits were de facto fully insured.
For the sample 1991-1996, we estimate a number of specifications. Given that we have information on the size of deposits over this period, we present estimates for small, medium, and large time deposits. Small deposits are those smaller than 120 UFs, which are also insured. Following the introduction of the banking law No. 18,576 of 1986, Chile adopted a new deposit insurance system that protects depositors up to 120 UFs. Medium deposits are defined as those between 120 UFs and 1,500
UFs. Large deposits are those above 1,500 UFs. We also estimate an equation for uninsured deposits; namely all deposits above 120 UFs. For deposits in U.S. dollars, we divide the sample in small (less than 2,000 dollars), medium (between 2,000 and 30,000 dollars), and large (more than 30,000 dollars). Dollar deposits in Chile account for only a small fraction of total deposits in Chile.
12
Overall, during the 1980s and 1990s, we find that deposits respond to bank risk taking. In particular, we find that a rise in bank capitalization and in the cash to assets ratio leads to an increase in the level and growth rate of deposits. On the other hand, a surge in the ratios of non-performing loans to assets and investment to assets has a negative impact on both the level and percent change in deposits.
The variable expenditure over assets has a positive impact on deposits. Return over assets has a negative 15 effect on deposits in the 1980s, but a positive effect in the growth rate of deposits during the 1990s. The F-tests show that risk characteristics are jointly significant, in all equations for peso deposits and in various specifications for dollar deposits. One of the regressions includes all available banks in the sample, namely, 37 banks. The greater number of banks in the post-crisis period is largely the outcome of the deregulation of the Mexican banking sector and the lifting of restrictions for foreign entry after 1995. Since the number of banks increases significantly, we estimate another regression that includes only the 12 banks for which we have data for the whole sample. This enables us to compare pre-crisis and post-crisis results.
The data set for Mexico does not provide information regarding the size or the currency denomination of deposits. This lack of information is not very problematic in our study of market discipline for Mexico. Due to legal restrictions, almost 100% of deposits are held in pesos, the local currency. Also, the legislation on deposit insurance does not distinguish between small and large deposits.
In principle, 100% of deposits are implicitly (although not legally) guaranteed in Mexico.
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The regressions in levels for Mexico provide strong evidence that deposits respond to bank risk across all periods. In particular, we find that an increase in the ratio of non-performing loans leads to a decline in the level of deposits. On the other hand, a rise in the cash to assets ratios brings about a rise in deposits during the pre-crisis and crisis periods. Finally, an increase in the ratio of consumption loans has a positive impact on the level of deposits across all samples for the 12 largest banks.
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While the evidence in favor of finding that deposits respond to risk is quite strong for the Mexican regressions in levels, in the case of the estimations for the growth rate of deposits, we only find some support for this hypothesis for the post-crisis period. If we consider all banks in the sample during the post-crisis period, we find that a rise in the capitalization ratio has a positive effect on the growth rate of deposits, while an increase in the ratio of commercial loans has the opposite effect.
Summarizing, the results discussed in this section indicate that there is evidence that deposits respond to bank risk characteristics. This result holds for insured, uninsured, medium, and large deposits in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico. In particular, we find support for the notion that deposits fall as bank risk taking grows. These findings are particularly robust for the case of Argentina and Chile. In the case of Argentina and Mexico, depositors' responsiveness seems to increase during the period following the tequila crisis.
III.b -Examining the Responsiveness of Interest Rates to Bank Risk Taking
The central finding from the previous section is that deposits fall in response to increases in bank risk taking. As mentioned before, these results could be consistent with the presence of both market and regulatory discipline. Aside from withdrawing their deposits from risky banks, depositors can exercise market discipline by demanding higher interest rates. To claim that market discipline exists, it is necessary to study whether riskier banks pay higher interest rates on deposits. By examining the behavior of interest rates, the purpose of this section is to verify that the response of deposits to bank risk taking, described in the previous section, is indeed consistent with market discipline. Therefore, we can only examine the behavior of the interest paid on all deposits.
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We find that across sample periods there is evidence of market discipline in Argentina. More specifically, for the period before, during, and after the tequila crisis, we find that banks with higher liquidity ratios paid lower interest rates. On the other hand, banks with a larger share of non-performing loans paid higher interest rates. The within estimates indicate that a rise in the capital-assets ratio reduces the interest rates paid by banks during the pre-crisis and crisis periods.
In the case of Chile, we present the within estimates for the interest rates paid by banks on deposits in Table IX . We only have information on the implicit rate paid on all deposits during the 1990s.
The results indicate that Chilean depositors require higher interest rates as bank risk taking increases. In particular, as their expenditure to asset ratio rises, banks are forced to pay higher interest rates. On the other hand, as the return over assets and the bank capitalization ratio increase, the interest rates paid by banks drop.
The within results for Mexico are presented in Table X . Out of the 12 banks for which we have deposit data, we only have information on the interest rates paid by 10 . Similarly, we have interest rate data on 34 out of the 37 banks we considered in the deposit regressions for the post-crisis period.
The results for Mexico also support the presence of market discipline. We find that increases in the proportion of non-performing loans raises the interest rates paid by banks, before, during, and after the tequila crisis. On the other hand, a rise in the cash to assets ratio and the capital to assets ratio reduces the interest rates charged to banks. Banks that increase the ratio of consumption loans and commercial loans have to face higher interest rates. On the other hand, an increase in the returns to assets ratio reduces interest rates, before and during the crisis.
In sum, the evidence from the three countries suggests that depositors require higher interest rates when banks undertake more risk. These results hold when we look at different partitions of the data. The finding that depositors charge higher interest rates to riskier banks leads us to conclude that market discipline is at work in these countries. In other words, the results suggest that the behavior of deposits is not just the consequence of regulatory pressures on risky banks.
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III.c -Evaluating the Credibility of the Deposit Insurance Schemes
As mentioned before, all three countries in our sample have different insurance schemes. Before the Mexican crisis, Argentina had no deposit insurance whatsoever. In April 1995, following the tequila crisis, Argentina introduced a partial deposit insurance scheme that covers depositors up to 20,000. In 1995, this insurance scheme covered 25% of depositors. In the case of Chile, in the 1980s, a limited insurance scheme was in place, however most deposits were de facto protected. In 1986, a new banking law introduced a number of sweeping reforms, including a redefinition of the deposit insurance scheme.
According to this new and, still current legislation, only deposits of up to 120 UFs are covered in the Chilean system. The coverage of this insurance scheme is limited to only 3-4% of deposits in the system.
On the other hand, Mexico has no formal system of deposit insurance. However, FOBAPROA implicitly protects 100% of deposits.
The results presented and discussed in section III.a show that both insured and uninsured depositors in Argentina and Chile discipline banks. For the case of Mexico, we also find evidence of market discipline, despite of the government's promise to protect all deposits. Therefore, the results suggest that in none of the three countries, the deposit insurance scheme in place is fully credible.
The finding that even insured depositors discipline banks may be due to a number of reasons.
Previous confiscations of deposits (like in Argentina during the 1980s) or instances when the government did not keep its promise could be fresh in depositors' minds. Deposit protection can be uncertain when the insurance schemes are under-funded and the fiscal costs of repaying deposits are large. Finally, it is possible that we observe discipline by insured depositors because, even if fundamentally the insurance is credible, depositors may want to avoid any costs they might face (typically in the form of delays) when banks fail. Repayments through the insurance fund usually take time. Moreover, when a bank fails, there are efforts to sell the failing bank to other institutions, in order to minimize the cost for the insurance fund. One of the major incentives for a healthy bank to buy a failing bank is to acquire the failed bank's deposits. Therefore, if deposits are returned through the deposit insurance, the value of the failing bank 19 decreases. As a consequence, both insured and uninsured deposits are only returned once the acquisition process is complete.
14 Having established that none of the insurance schemes in our sample is fully credible, in this section, we compare and contrast their credibility. If the deposit insurance is credible, we should find that uninsured depositors respond more to bank risk taking relative to insured depositors. We explicitly test the credibility of the deposit insurance schemes in Argentina and Chile because, for these two countries, we can separately study the behavior of insured and uninsured deposit flows during the 1990s. To test and compare the credibility of the systems, for Argentina and Chile, we run a regression of the ratio of uninsured time over total time deposits against bank risk characteristics. In the case of Mexico, we cannot estimate this model because 100% of deposits are implicitly insured.
The results obtained, and reported in Table XI , are very interesting. In particular, we find that almost no variable is significant in the case of Argentina. This indicates that there is no difference between the responsiveness of insured and uninsured depositors to bank risk taking. Consequently, we conclude that the deposit insurance is not credible in this country. On the other hand, for the case of Chile, we find that uninsured depositors seem to respond more to increases in bank risk. Therefore, we conclude that Chile's insurance scheme is more credible. In credible systems, insured depositors have fewer incentives to respond to bank risk taking relative to uninsured depositors.
Another way of analyzing the credibility of the deposit insurance schemes is to consider the results displayed in Table XII. The table shows The results for Argentina indicate that the proportion of the variance of deposits explained by bank fundamentals increases substantially after the deposit insurance system was established. This increase occurs even for insured deposits. The proportion of the variance explained by bank fundamentals 20 in the estimations for insured deposits is at least as large as the one explained by these variables in the equations for uninsured deposits. On the other hand, for peso deposits in Chile, we find the opposite results. In particular, the proportion of the variance explained by bank fundamentals among uninsured deposits is larger than the one explained by these variables in the regression for insured deposits. Thus, these results support the findings from the regressions for the ratio of uninsured deposits displayed in Table XI .
One of the reasons why the credibility of the deposit insurance scheme in Argentina seems to be lower than that of Chile, may be the fact that the Argentinean deposit insurance scheme has been tested since its inception. On the other hand, the Chilean system has not. In particular, in the period following the tequila crisis, Argentinean depositors found that in most cases when a bank failure occurred, government authorities tried to find a buyer for the bank and in the meantime indefinitely froze deposits.
Also, it became very clear then that the deposit insurance scheme was under-capitalized. On the other hand, during the 1990s, Chile has not had any bank failures or crises. Therefore, there is no obvious reason for depositors to doubt the willingness of the authorities to obey by the current deposit insurance legislation.
III.d -Are Banking Crises "Wake-Up Calls" for Depositors?
Banking crises are unique episodes to examine market discipline. The risks of bank failures and of losing deposits become more evident and are magnified during crises. In many cases, banks actually fail and deposits are lost or frozen.
In this section, we analyze whether the responsiveness of depositors to bank risk taking is affected by banking crises.
The regression results on the behavior of deposits, discussed in section III.a, show that bank risk characteristics seem to be more significant in explaining deposits after banking crises episodes. On the 21 other hand, the empirical estimations regarding the behavior of interest rates, discussed in section III.b, do not signal significant differences between the period before and after crises.
In this section, we explicitly try to quantify the effect of banking crises on market discipline. We examine the relative importance of bank fundamentals by calculating the variance explained by these variables. In particular, we want to evaluate whether crises are wake-up calls for depositors, causing the variance explained by bank fundamentals to increase following these episodes. Table XII The results for Argentina suggest that the proportion of the variance explained by bank fundamentals increased substantially in the post-crisis period (June 1995 -March 1997 . This occurs for the models estimated with equations (1) and (2) for peso and dollar deposits. During the crisis period, the proportion explained by bank fundamentals decreases notably, probably because of the large macroeconomic and systemic shocks associated with the crisis. In other words, time effects become particularly relevant during this period. On the other hand, the results for interest rates do not show an increase in the proportion of the variance explained by bank fundamentals.
The case of Mexico offers very similar evidence, particularly when we compare the 12 banks that exist in the entire sample. We find that the proportion of the variance explained by bank risk characteristics increases substantially after the crisis, when we look at bank deposits. The model for interest rates does not yield significant changes in the explanatory power of bank risk characteristics. As in the case of Argentina, during the Mexican crisis, we observe large time effects.
For Chile, it is harder to compare the crisis and non-crisis periods. In sum, the results suggest that banking crises are wake-up calls for depositors. In particular, the extent to which depositors shift their funds in and out of banks increases following a banking crisis. The evidence for Argentina and Mexico, where the crisis was clearly defined in time, is very suggestive. The degree of market discipline via deposit withdrawals rises substantially. In particular, in Argentina the responsiveness of depositors to bank risk characteristics increases even though this country introduced a deposit insurance system during the crisis to guarantee deposits. In all three countries, the extent of market discipline through higher interest rates does not vary substantially before and after crises.
The fact that we do not observe significant changes in the variance of interest rates explained by bank fundamentals over the sample, indicates that depositors discipline banks through interest rates at all times. However, when crises occur, we observe a surge in the variance of deposits explained by bank risk characteristics. This evidence suggests that following crises high interest may not fully compensate depositors for the risks they undertake. During these times, depositors realize that their funds can be lost, so the degree to which they discipline banks via deposit withdrawals increases relative to pre-crisis periods.
IV -Conclusions
This paper concentrated on two issues largely unexplored by the existing literature on market discipline. In the first place, we empirically analyzed the relationship between market discipline and 23 deposit insurance. Secondly, we investigated the impact of banking crises on market discipline. In particular, this paper focused on the banking industries of Argentina, Chile, and Mexico during the 1980s and 1990s. The developments in these countries, together with the detailed bank level data set we gathered provided a unique opportunity to study the relationship between market discipline, deposit insurance, and banking crises.
The results presented in this paper helped us to conclude that depositors in Argentina, Chile, and
Mexico punish banks for risky behavior, both by withdrawing their deposits and by requiring higher interest rates. With respect to the behavior of deposits, we found evidence of market discipline whether we examined deposits in local or foreign currency. Also, both small and large depositors seem to discipline banks. Even though large depositors have a significant amount of funds at risk, their deposits probably represent a smaller proportion of their wealth. Therefore, we are not surprised by the result that small and large depositors discipline banks.
Regarding the relationship between market discipline and deposit insurance, we could reject the null hypothesis that insured and uninsured depositors do not respond to bank risk taking. As discussed earlier, this result suggests that none of the deposit insurance schemes is fully credible. Among other reasons, a deposit insurance scheme may not be credible if governments have reneged their promises in the past, if the deposit insurance scheme is under-capitalized, and if depositors are concerned about the cost of repayment (typically in the form of delays) through the deposit insurance fund.
We explicitly analyzed and compared the credibility of the partial deposit insurance schemes in Argentina and Chile, where we could easily separate insured from uninsured depositors. To test the credibility of the deposit insurance schemes in these countries, we regressed the ratio of uninsured deposits to total deposits on the bank risk characteristics. To the extent that the insurance scheme is credible, uninsured depositors should respond more strongly to bank risk taking relative to the insured counterparts. The results indicated that while in Chile uninsured depositors seem to respond more 24 aggressively to bank risks, in Argentina, we do not observe significant differences in the response of both kinds of depositors.
The analysis of variance showed that bank fundamentals are not only jointly and individually significant, but also they seem to be important vis-à-vis systemic and macroeconomic factors (as captured by time specific dummies). Furthermore, regarding the impact of banking crises on market discipline, these results indicated that crises seem to be "wake-up" calls for depositors. In particular, we found that the degree of market discipline, via deposit withdrawals, becomes more important immediately after banking crises. On the other hand, before and during crises, the extent of market discipline is much more limited. Interest rates are responsive to bank risk taking throughout the sample. These results suggest that depositors become more aware of the risk of losing deposits, and start to shift them after they observe bank failures. The results for Chile indicate that, as crises become a thing of the past, the degree of market discipline declines.
This paper has evaluated the presence of market discipline and investigated its relationship to deposit insurance and banking crises. However, we leave for future research the task of identifying the specific channels through which depositors obtain information regarding banks fundamentals. Depositors may be getting the information directly from balance sheets, financial advisors, newspaper articles, or rumors. Future research on this subject could shed light on what mechanisms may help depositors to distinguish "good" from "bad" banks. T-statistics are in parentheses. Robust standard errors-White correction for heteroskedasticity. The peso-dollar exchange rate is equal to 1. Then, the sign $ denotes both Argentine pesos and U.S. dollars. *, **, *** indicate 10, 5, 1 percent level of significance, respectively. T-statistics are in parentheses. Robust standard errors-White correction for heteroskedasticity. The peso-dollar exchange rate is equal to 1. Then, the sign $ denotes both Argentine pesos and U.S. dollars. *, **, *** indicate 10, 5, 1 percent level of significance, respectively. Results from fixed-effects models are reported when the F-test for fixed effects is statistically significant, otherwise pooled estimators are reported. Estimators for time dummies (included in all regressions) and fixed effects are not reported in the table to save space. T-statistics are in parentheses. Robust standard errors-White correction for heteroskedasticity. *, **, *** indicate 10, 5, 1 percent level of significance, respectively. Results from fixed-effects models are reported when the F-test for fixed effects is statistically significant, otherwise pooled estimators are reported. Estimators for time dummies (included in all regressions) and fixed effects are not reported in the table to save space. T-statistics are in parentheses. Robust standard errors-White correction for heteroskedasticity. *, **, *** indicate 10, 5, 1 percent level of significance, respectively. 
